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Although sometimes difficult to detect, governmental power abuses
can have detrimental impacts. Property tax assessments provide an
effective lens to examine this phenomenon because, given the complexity of
calculating property tax assessments, it is difficult for citizens to know
when local government has exceeded its legitimate taxing authority and
crossed into the realm of illegal extraction. Michigan is an ideal case study
because it protects property owners by making assessment-related power
abuses more visible through a unique state constitutional provision:
property tax assessments cannot exceed 50 percent of a property’s market
value. Abuses have persisted nevertheless. Between 2011 and 2015, one in
four properties in Detroit were subject to property tax foreclosure, and
inflated property tax assessments that violate the Michigan Constitution
are the unseen thread in this complex tapestry of foreclosure.
Against this backdrop, this Article makes three primary contributions.
First, no other article has argued and proven that property tax assessments
in Detroit are illegal. Using assessment and sales data from 2009–2015 for
the entire City of Detroit, we find that property tax assessments are
substantially in excess of the state constitutional limit, and this illegality is
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most pronounced for lower-valued properties. Second, to remedy inflated
assessments, in 2014 and 2015 Detroit’s assessor implemented assessment
decreases ranging from 5 percent to 20 percent for select districts, but we
find that systemic assessment inequity persisted for lower valued properties
despite these reductions. Third, this Article uses the case of illegal property
tax assessments in Detroit to develop a new theoretical concept called
“stategraft,” which is when state agents transfer property from residents to
the state in violation of the state’s own laws and to the detriment of a
vulnerable group. Although the concept was developed using the Detroit
case, stategraft applies beyond Detroit to many other cases, including the
discriminatory fines imposed and enforced by the police and courts in
Ferguson, Missouri; broken treaties with Native Americans; and abuses of
civil forfeiture laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Local governments must determine the taxable value of properties in
their jurisdictions, and these assessments are the basis of property tax
calculations. Property taxes are a substantial source of revenue for local
governments, so to protect property owners from paying more than their
fair share, most jurisdictions require assessments to be uniform and/or
equitable.1 But they are often neither.2 As a result, property tax assessments
1. See GLENN FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 152,
188 (1996). See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected
under general laws.”); UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“[A]ll tangible property in the State that is not
exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at a uniform
and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law . . . .”).
2. See Lee Harris, Assessing Discrimination: The Influence of Race in Residential Property Tax
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provide a unique and effective lens to study the larger phenomenon of
governmental power abuses that are difficult for citizens to detect or defend
against.3 This Article uses Detroit as a case study because the Michigan
State Constitution goes beyond the equitable and uniform mandate, which
is inexact and vulnerable to varying interpretations. Instead, the Michigan
Constitution has an explicit cap on assessments that allows property owners
to more easily detect assessment-related abuses. More specifically, the
Michigan Constitution prohibits property assessments that exceed 50
percent of a property’s market value: “The legislature shall provide for the
determination of true cash value of such property; the proportion of true
cash value at which such property shall be uniformly assessed, which shall
not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50 percent . . . .”4 Although there have
been several articles about property tax assessments in Detroit,5 no other
article has proven that assessment practices in Detroit violate the Michigan
Constitution.
More importantly, this Article uses the case of illegal property tax
assessments in Detroit to develop a new concept called “stategraft,” which
is when state agents transfer property from residents to the state in violation
of the state’s own laws and to the detriment of a vulnerable group.
Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2004). See generally Olha Krupa, Housing Crisis
and Vertical Equity of the Property Tax in a Market Value-Based Assessment System, 42 PUB. FIN. REV.
555 (2014) (discussing increases in vertical inequity in Indiana as a result of corrupt property tax
assessments); Carmela Quintos, Improving Assessment Equity in Mass Appraisal Models, 11 J. PROP.
TAX ASSESSMENT & ADMIN. 53 (2014) (affirming that knowledge-based, methodological problems, as
well as logistical, administrative problems associated with tax assessments, frequently compromise both
vertical and horizontal equity).
3. See, e.g., Itai Beeri & Doron Navot, Local Political Corruption: Potential Structural
Malfunctions at the Central-Local, Local-Local, and Intra-Local Levels, 15 PUB. MGMT. REV. 712,
720–21, 729, 735 (2013); Brian Rapp & Frank Patitucci, Improving the Performance of City
Government: A Third Alternative, 6 PUBLIUS 63, 76–77, 89 (1976); Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local
Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 105, 115–18 (2016).
4. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(a)(1) (2013).
5. E.g., GARY SANDS & MARK SKIDMORE, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, DETROIT AND THE
PROPERTY TAX: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE EQUITY AND ENHANCE REVENUE 3 (2015) (proposing
strategies to increase tax revenue and mitigate inequity in property tax assessments); Timothy R. Hodge
et al., Assessment Growth Limits and Mobility: Evidence from Home Sale Data in Detroit, Michigan, 68
NAT’L TAX. J. 573, 590–91, 595–96 (2015) (concluding that Michigan’s assessment growth cap makes
property sales less likely); Timothy R. Hodge et al., Assessment Inequity in a Declining Housing
Market: The Case of Detroit, 45 REAL EST. ECON. 237, 254 (2017) [hereinafter Hodge et al.,
Assessment Inequity] (concluding that assessment practices have created horizontal and vertical
inequity); Timothy R. Hodge et al., Tax Base Erosion and Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment
Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit, 43 PUB. FIN. REV. 636, 648–55 (2015) (stating that Michigan’s
assessment growth cap creates horizontal and vertical inequity); Mark Skidmore et al., Property Value
Assessment Growth Limits and Redistribution of Property Tax Payments: Evidence from Michigan, 63
NAT’L TAX. J. 509, 515 & n.17 (2010) (finding that Michigan’s assessment growth cap allows
homeowners to see a tax reduction over time).
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Stategraft is a phenomenon that also applies beyond Detroit to various
other cases, including discriminatory fines and fees levied by police and
enforced by courts in Ferguson, Missouri;6 broken treaties with Native
Americans; and abuse of civil forfeiture statutes.
Determining whether property tax assessments in Detroit are
unconstitutional is an important research question for three primary
reasons. First, in a typical property tax bill, the assessed value of each
property is multiplied by the property tax rate, subject to various
exemptions.7 Detroit residents endure the highest property tax rates in
Michigan and some of the highest in the country.8 In addition, this Article
shows that the majority of residential properties are unconstitutionally
assessed at over 50 percent of the property’s market value. As a result,
Detroit residents are being hit twice: not only are their assessed values
illegally high, they are then multiplied by one of the nation’s highest rates.
Many Detroiters have not been able to afford this double hit, and
nonpayment has resulted in widespread tax foreclosure.9
From 2011–2015, the Wayne County treasurer foreclosed on 100,116
Detroit properties for unpaid property taxes, although there are only about
384,675 properties in the city.10 This means that about one in four Detroit
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 12–15 (2015).
7. See MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE 1–2 (2016) (explaining the state
assessment process).
8. See MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2015 AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX REPORT 2 (2016),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/2015_625_Ad_Valorem_Tax_Levy_Report_514334_7.pdf
(showing Wayne County with the state’s highest average property tax rate, at $55.11 per $1,000 of
assessed value).
9. To understand the property tax foreclosure process in Wayne County, see Real Property Tax
Forfeiture and Foreclosures, MICH. TAXES, http://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43535_
55601---,00.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). See also James Alm et al., Detroit Property Tax
Delinquency: Social Contract in Crisis, 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 280, 280–81 (2014) (concluding that
properties with certain characteristics are more likely to be tax delinquent); Joshua M. Akers, Making
Markets: Think Tank Legislation and Private Property in Detroit, 34 URB. GEOGRAPHY 1070, 1070–93
(2013) (analyzing Detroit’s tax foreclosure crisis and the legislative process leading to it); Margaret Dewar
et al., Disinvesting in the City: The Role of Tax Foreclosure in Detroit, 51 URB. AFF. REV. 587, 607
(2015) [hereinafter Dewar et al., Disinvesting]; Margaret E. Dewar, Selling Tax-Reverted Land: Lessons
from Cleveland and Detroit, 72 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 167, 169–71 (2006) [hereinafter Dewar, Lessons]
(comparing Cleveland’s land-bank system for disposing of abandoned land with Detroit’s method);
Ellen Kirtner, Interrupting the Blight Cycle: Managing the Future of Properties in Tax Foreclosure
Sales Through Pre- and Post-Sale Interventions, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1097–1100 (2016)
(offering legal suggestions for local governments to put foreclosed properties to productive use).
10. Detroit, LOVELAND, https://makeloveland.com/us/mi/wayne/detroit#b=neighborhoods (last
visited Jan. 19, 2018); Alex Alsup, A Recent History of Tax Foreclosure, LOVELAND (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://makeloveland.com/blog/a-recent-history-of-tax-foreclosure. See also Archival Tax Foreclosures
in Detroit, 2002–2013, DATA DRIVEN DETROIT, http://d3-d3.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/
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properties were subject to property tax foreclosure during this five-year
period.11 In 2015 alone, the treasurer foreclosed on 28,158 Detroit
properties.12 That is, in 2015, Detroit had 3,949 property tax foreclosures
per 100,000 people, which is drastically higher than other cities (e.g., New
York City: 52; San Francisco: 48; Los Angeles County: 8; Erie County
(Buffalo), New York: 62; St. Louis County, Missouri: 197).13
Since the primary economic asset of many Americans is their home,
property tax foreclosure can have adverse financial impacts, but it can also
have injurious emotional, social, political, and cultural consequences as
well.14 Like many other material objects, homes exist in tandem with
emotional landscapes, which suffuse them with significant intangible value.
An individual’s childhood home, for instance, is often filled with memories
and emotional investments such that when the home is foreclosed upon, a
family loses more than an economic asset; their personhood is also
9438afd734d348a694c42a28c4103731_0 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
11. Alsup, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. These numbers were calculated by dividing the number of tax-foreclosed properties listed in
foreclosure sales in 2015 by each region’s 2010 census population and multiplying by 100,000. New
York City had a 2010 population of 8,175,133; San Francisco, 805,704; Los Angeles County,
9,818,605; Erie County, 919,040; and St. Louis County, 998,954. Community Facts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU: AM. FACT FINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml
(last visited Jan. 19, 2018). In New York City, 4,228 property tax liens were sold in 2015. Number of
Properties on City’s 90-Day Lien Sales List Is Falling, REAL DEAL (Mar. 16, 2016, 10:32 A.M.),
https://therealdeal.com/2016/03/10/number-of-properties-on-citys-90-day-lien-sales-list-down-from-last-year.
In San Francisco, 389 tax foreclosed properties were auctioned in 2015. CITY & CTY. OF S.F., PUBLIC
AUCTION SALES OF TAX-DEFAULTED PROPERTY (2015), http://sftreasurer.org/sites/default/
files/San%20Francisco%202015%20Tax%20Auction%20Post-Sale%20Report.pdf. In Los Angeles
County, 781 tax foreclosed properties were auctioned in 2015. CTY. OF L.A. TREASURER & TAX
COLLECTOR SECURED PROP. DIV., 2015A FOLLOW-UP ONLINE AUCTION (2015),
https://ttc.lacounty.gov/proptax/docs/2015AInternetSoldParcelsFinallist.pdf; CTY. OF L.A. TREASURER
& TAX COLLECTOR SECURED PROP. DIV., 2015A PUBLIC AUCTION (2015), https://ttc.lacounty.gov/
proptax/docs/2015APublicSoldParcelsFinallist.pdf; CTY. OF L.A. TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR
SECURED PROP. DIV., 2015B ONLINE AUCTION (2015), https://ttc.lacounty.gov/proptax/docs/
2015BSoldParcelsFinallist.pdf. In Erie County, 569 properties went to the 2015 tax foreclosure auction.
Auction & Foreclosure Information, REAL PROP. TAX SERVICES, https://web.archive.org/web/
20150816075239/http://www2.erie.gov/ecrpts/index.php?q=auction-foreclosure-information (last
visited Jan. 19, 2018). In St. Louis, 1,964 properties were listed in 2015 tax sales. ST. LOUIS CTY. DEP’T
OF REVENUE, 8/24/15 1ST 2ND SALE (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20170116011612/
http://revenue.stlouisco.com:80/Collection/TaxSales/2015AuctionBook1st2nd.pdf.
14. See Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary
Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 172 (2016); Christopher
E. Herbert et al., Is Homeownership Still an Effective Means of Building Wealth for Low-Income and
Minority Households? (Was it Ever?) 2, 4, 27 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working
Paper No. HBTL-06, 2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/hbtl-06.pdf
(finding that home ownership continues to contribute significantly to household wealth and reporting
that homeownership accounted for 22% of average wealth among homeowners in 2010).

268

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:263

impacted.15 Also, a house is often the basis of social belonging—a gateway
to the benefits and burdens of community membership.16 As neighbors
interact, valuable social bonds and networks are formed, and thus
foreclosure often leads to social disruption.17 Politically, property serves as
a bulwark against state encroachment on individual autonomy.18 Although
people cannot remodel public buildings to reflect their individual tastes,
walk around naked in federal buildings, or exclude others from a public
parks at will, all of these activities are allowed in privately owned homes,
where citizens have greater autonomy to live the kinds of lives they have
reason to value. Foreclosure curtails this important source of autonomy.
Foreclosure can also adversely affect cultural and identity interests.
Individual and group identities are often closely tied to a particular home,
neighborhood, or city, and a home, in particular, can reflect a person’s
unique personality and become intertwined with her sense of self.19 In sum,
when the state confiscates a home for nonpayment of property taxes, there
are both monetary and non-monetary consequences.
Second, on average, Detroit’s residents are more economically and
socially insecure than other Americans (see Table 1). Unconstitutional
assessments inflate property tax bills, which can be a significant financial
blow to this already vulnerable population—regardless of whether or not it
causes them to lose their homes. In addition, less affluent owners are less
15. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (“[T]he
relationship between property and personhood . . . has commonly been both ignored and taken for
granted in legal thought. The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper
self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment. The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights.”).
16. See Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: STRIKING AN EQUITABLE BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 3, 13
(Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000) (“Property law helps to structure and shape the contours of
social relationships. Choices of property rules ineluctably entail choices about the quality and character
of human relationships and myriad choices about the kind of society we will collectively create.”).
17. Through in-depth interviews with people who lost their homes and entire communities as a
result of urban renewal during the 1950s and 1960s, Mindy Fullilove—a board-certified psychiatrist
and public health professor at Columbia University—found that these displaced populations suffered
from what she calls “root shock,” “the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s
emotional ecosystem.” MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 11 (2004).
18. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771, 787 (1964) (“[P]roperty
performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones
within which the majority has to yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and ‘antisocial’
activities are given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry.
The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of Rights comes into play only at
extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary
affairs of life.”).
19. Radin, supra note 15.
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likely to challenge property tax bills.20 Thus, when poorer homeowners are
subject to unconstitutional assessments, these assessments are more likely
to stand uncorrected. That is, invisible abuses of state power stand
uncorrected. Consequently, poor homeowners—who are most unable to
afford illegal and inequitable assessments—are the population that is most
often subject to them.
TABLE 1. Detroit’s Divergence from National Averages
National

Detroit

$29,829

$15,562

Unemployment Rate (Nov. 2016)b

4.6%

5.7%

% of Residents Living Under the Poverty
Line (2016)c

12.7%

39.4%

Homeless (per 1,000 people) (2016)d

1.78

20.98

Bachelor’s Degree (over 25 years old)
(2012–2016)e

30.3%

13.8%

Public School Standardized Test Rates
(% of 8th graders at or above proficient
levels) (2015)f

32% (reading)
32% (math)

7% (reading)
4% (math)

% Black, % White (2010)g

12.6%, 72.4%

82.7%, 10.6%

Per Capita Income (2012–2016)a

a. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
detroitcitymichigan,US/PST045217 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
b. Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUDV261980400000003 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018); Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/
timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
c. QuickFacts, supra note a.
d. The national level was calculated by dividing the total number of homeless people
nationwide in a single night in January 2016 (549,928) by the 2010 population of the United States
(308,745,538) and multiplying by 1,000. The Detroit level was calculated by dividing the number of
homeless people in Detroit in 2016 (14,117) by the 2010 population of Detroit (672,795) and
multiplying by 1,000. See HOMELESS ACTION NETWORK OF DETROIT, 2016 STATE OF
HOMELESSNESS ANNUAL REPORT 3, http://www.handetroit.org/s/FINAL_2017_HAND-ANNUAL-

20. William M. Doerner & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, An Empirical Analysis of the Property Tax
Appeals Process, 10 J. PROP. TAX ASSESSMENT & ADMIN. 5, 16–17, 26 (2014) (discussing the fact that
richer property holders have disproportionately more success with appeals than poorer and minority
populations.); William M. Doerner & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, The Role of Representative Agents in the
Property Tax Appeals Process, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 59, 60–61, 89 (2015) [hereinafter Doerner &
Ihlanfeldt, Representative Agents] (discussing the central role that unregulated appeals experts play,
their focus on more affluent homeowners, and the resulting effects on existing disparities in property
tax burdens).
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REPORT-SPREAD.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., THE 2016 ANNUAL HOMELESS
ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 8 (2016), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/
documents/2016-AHAR-Part-1.pdf; QuickFacts, supra note a.
e. QuickFacts, supra note a.
f. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2015 MATHEMATICS TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT
SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR DETROIT (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/subject/publications/
dst2015/pdf/2016049XR8.pdf; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2015 READING TRIAL URBAN
DISTRICT SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR DETROIT (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
subject/publications/dst2015/pdf/2016048xr8.pdf.
g. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf; Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin
2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AM. FACT FINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (geography selected for Detroit
City, Michigan).

Third, there is preliminary evidence suggesting that the
unconstitutional assessments in Detroit are racially discriminatory.21 On
July 13, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan,
along with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the law firm of Covington
& Burling, filed a lawsuit alleging that the unconstitutional property tax
assessments and the resulting foreclosures in Wayne County (the taxing
jurisdiction where Detroit is located) disparately impact African
Americans, who constitute 82.7% of Detroit’s population.22 The lawsuit
claims that Detroit’s assessor is unconstitutionally assessing property
owners, while the assessors in Wayne County’s other jurisdictions—which
are not majority African American—are not engaging in this
unconstitutional behavior. Consequently, African-American homeowners
“lose their homes through tax foreclosure at a higher rate than non-AfricanAmerican homeowners in Wayne County,”23 violating the Fair Housing
Act of 1968.24
If the claims made in the lawsuit prove true,25 then unconstitutional
assessments in Detroit are part of a long and sordid history of racially
21. See generally Plaintiffs’ Expert Report, Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Sabree, No. 16-008807CH (Mich. 3d Cir. Ct. 2016).
22. Complaint at 2–3, Morningside Cmty. Org., No. 16-008807-CH; Race and Hispanic or
Latino Origin 2010, supra Table 1 note g. In a follow-up paper, Bernadette Atuahene will test whether
the assessors in Wayne County’s majority-white jurisdictions are illegally assessing residents to the
same extent as the assessors in the county’s majority-African-American jurisdictions.
23. Complaint at 46, Morningside Cmty. Org., No. 16-008807-CH.
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012). See generally Bernadette Atuahene, Assessing Racial
Discrimination: Property Tax Assessments and the Fair Housing Act, 112 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018).
25. Plaintiffs sued both the City of Detroit and Wayne County. Litigation against Detroit is
ongoing. But, the lower courts dismissed the litigation against Wayne County because they claimed that
the case should have been brought before the Michigan Tax Tribunal. Plaintiffs have filed an
interlocutor appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. See Plaintiffs’ Application to File for Leave to
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discriminatory property tax administration in the United States.26 In the Jim
Crow South, officials routinely assessed property owned by African
Americans at a higher proportion of its market value than they did whiteowned property, leading to high property tax payments—paradoxically
used to fund institutions and services that the state prohibited African
Americans from accessing.27 Also, when their real estate became valuable
or officials wanted to punish them for civil rights protest actions, one
conventional mechanism for dispossessing African-Americans was to
inflate property tax assessments.28 Unfortunately, these abuses of
governmental power did not perish along with the Jim Crow South. A 2004
study of property tax assessments in New Haven, Connecticut found that in
communities where African Americans and Latinos constituted the
majority of residents, assessments were on average 40 percent higher than
the market value of the homes.29 In contrast, for neighborhoods occupied
predominately by white residents, assessments were on average 20 percent
less than the market value of the homes.30
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we examine the legal
framework for assessments in Michigan. We then review the literature and
discuss our methodology in Part II. In Part III, we analyze the data. Using
assessment and sales data from 2009–2015 for the entire City of Detroit,
we provide a dynamic view of how assessment inequity has changed during
the life cycle of the housing crisis and the mayor-led, across-the-board cuts
in property tax assessments, which occurred in 2014 and 2015. We find
strong evidence of unconstitutional assessments across all the years
studied. But assessments for lower-valued homes are substantially higher

Appeal, Morningside Cmty. Org v. Sabree, No. 156707 (Mich. Nov. 1, 2017).
26. See Kenneth K. Baar, Property Tax Assessment Discrimination Against Low-Income
Neighborhoods, 13 URB. LAW. 333, 338–56 (1981) (providing an overview of discriminatory property
assessments); Harris, supra note 2, at 4 (finding that “residents of majority-minority neighborhoods are
assessed at higher effective rates than residents of majority-white neighborhoods”); William S. Hendon,
Discrimination Against Negro Homeowners in Property Tax Assessment, 27 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 125,
125–32 (1968) (concluding that property assessments are higher for black homeowners than for white
homeowners). See generally Andrew W. Kahrl, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory Property
Assessments and the Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, 82 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 579 (2016)
(discussing the history of discriminatory tax assessments in the American South through the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
27. Kahrl, supra note 26, at 585, 587–89 (“In 1916 the average assessment on white-owned
farmland in Virginia, for example, was 33.1 percent of its market value; for black-owned land, it was
45.3 percent of market value.”).
28. Id.
29. See Lee Harris, Assessing Discrimination: The Influence of Race in Residential Property Tax
Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2004).
30. Id.
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than 50 percent of their market value, while assessments for higher-valued
homes are closer to this state constitutional standard.31 Although we offer
some explanatory hypotheses in Part IV, we leave it to future research to
determine the economic and political forces that brought about this
pervasive unconstitutionality and why it has persisted for so long. In the
short term, we recommend that Detroit place a moratorium on tax
foreclosures for homes that are owner-occupied until it can ensure that it is
in compliance with the Michigan Constitution. The City of Detroit must
also ensure that property taxes owed by tax-delinquent homeowners are
accurate. Finally, in Part V, based on the Detroit case, we develop a new
concept called “stategraft.” More importantly, we demonstrate how this
concept applies beyond Detroit.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENTS
A. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION’S ASSESSMENT PROVISION:
THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
By law, all taxable properties in the City of Detroit must be assessed
on an annual basis by the city’s assessment division.32 In 1963, Michigan
approved a new constitution, which drastically changed the procedure for
determining the assessed value of properties. According to Article IX,
Section 3 of the state constitution:
The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad valorem taxation
of real and tangible personal property not exempt by law except for taxes
levied for school operating purposes. The legislature shall provide for the
determination of true cash value of such property; the proportion of true
cash value at which such property shall be uniformly assessed, which
shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50 percent; and for a system of
equalization of assessments.33

This constitutional provision goes on to say that property tax
assessments may be even lower than 50 percent of the property’s true cash
value because assessments can increase by no more than 5 percent per year
so long as the property is not sold.34 In addition, the 1978 Headlee
31. In January 2017, the City of Detroit completed a long overdue citywide re-assessment of all
residential properties. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that 90 percent or more of properties valued less
than $18,500 were still assessed in violation of the Michigan Constitution. See Bernadette Atuahene,
Detroit’s Homeowners Deserve Better, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017), http://detne.ws/2jUcLgU.
32. See MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 1; WILLIAM T. DUST, MANUAL OF THE
COMMON COUNCIL AND OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT 29 (1886).
33. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
34. Id. (“For taxes levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the legislature shall provide that the
taxable value of each parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall not increase each year
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Amendment placed additional limits on local taxing powers, including
voter approval for increases in property tax rates (also known as millage
rates) that go beyond the Amendment’s guidelines.35
The Michigan legislature codified Article IX, Section 3 of the state
constitution in Section 211.27a(1) of the Michigan Compiled Laws:
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, property shall be assessed
at 50% of its true cash value.”36 The legislature has defined true cash value
as “the usual selling price at the place where the property to which the term
is applied is at the time of assessment, being the price that could be
obtained for the property at private sale . . . .”37 The Michigan Supreme
Court has declared that true cash value and fair market value are
synonymous, and this is now a well-settled principle.38 Consequently, if
Detroit properties are assessed at more than 50 percent of their fair market
value, there is a direct breach of the state constitution and supporting
legislation.
It is also well established that assessors are allowed to use diverse
appraisal methods to determine a property’s market value.39 The legislature
did not designate a specific valuation method for determining a property’s
by more than the increase in the immediately preceding year in the general price level, as defined
in section 33 of this article, or 5 percent, whichever is less until ownership of the parcel of property is
transferred. When ownership of the parcel of property is transferred as defined by law, the parcel shall
be assessed at the applicable proportion of current true cash value.”).
35. MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 26–31. See also Kevin C. Kennedy, The First Twenty Years of the
Headlee Amendment, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1031, 1031–32 (1999) (evaluating the Headlee
Amendment’s four core provisions: (1) that state, property, and other local taxes could not increase
beyond the guidelines set out in the Amendment without voter approval; (2) that the state could not
require new expenditures by local governments without providing financing; (3) that the state could not
reduce the proportion of state spending used to assist local governments; and (4) that the state could not
shift the tax burden to local governments).
36. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(a)(1) (2017).
37. Id. § 211.27.
38. See Meadowlanes Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. City of Holland, 473 N.W.2d 636, 642 n.17
(Mich. 1991); C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Mich. State Tax Comm’n, 221 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Mich. 1974). See
also Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v. City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998) (“True cash value is synonymous with fair market value.”); Samonek v. Norvall Twp., 527
N.W.2d 24, 26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. City of Warren, 483 N.W.2d
416, 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
39. See Meadowlanes, 473 N.W.2d at 642; Cty. of Washtenaw v. State Tax Comm’n, 373
N.W.2d 697, 705 (Mich. 1985); Antisdale v. City of Galesburg, 362 N.W.2d 632, 636–37 (Mich. 1984);
President Inn Props., LLC v. City of Grand Rapids, 806 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); Great
Lakes Div., 576 N.W.2d at 678; Samonek, 527 N.W.2d at 26–27; Jones & Laughlin, 483 N.W.2d at
419; Teledyne Cont’l Motors v. Muskegon Twp., 378 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985);
Northwood Apartments v. City of Royal Oak, 295 N.W.2d 639, 642–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Safran
Printing Co. v. City of Detroit, 276 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Consumers Power Co. v.
Big Prairie Twp., 265 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

274

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:263

true cash value, and so the task of determining which approach is most
appropriate for any given context has fallen to the Michigan courts.40 As
the Michigan Supreme Court explains, “[a]ny method for determination of
true cash value which is recognized as accurate and reasonably related to
fair market valuation will fill the statutory prescription and is an acceptable
indicator of true cash value.”41
The courts have recognized three standard approaches: (1) the costless-depreciation approach, (2) the sales-comparison or market approach,
and (3) the capitalization-of-income approach.42 More importantly, the
courts have made clear that whichever approach is used, “[t]he ultimate
goal of the valuation process is a well-supported conclusion that reflects the
study of all factors that influence the market value of the subject
property.”43
For appraisals of residential housing, the industry standard is the
market approach, which determines a property’s true cash value by
analyzing recent sales of comparable properties.44 This approach requires
assessors to adjust the sale price of comparable properties, taking into
consideration factors such as the property’s size, age, condition, location,
existing use, zoning, natural assets, and present economic income.45 One
potential drawback of the market approach is that, in certain instances, the
sale price might not be the “usual selling price” due to factors personal to
the parties.46 For instance, it is not uncommon for parents to transfer
property to their children at discounted rates. Nevertheless, when the
assessor considers the sale prices of numerous comparable properties, she

40. Antisdale, 362 N.W.2d at 636.
41. C.A.F. Inv., 221 N.W.2d at 592 n.2.
42. Meadowlanes, 473 N.W.2d at 642; Antisdale, 362 N.W.2d at 636–37 (citations omitted)
(“Generally, there presently are three methods of valuation which are acceptable to the Michigan Tax
Tribunal and the courts. They are the cost-less-depreciation approach, the capitalization-of-income
approach, and the market approach.”); Great Lakes Div., 576 N.W.2d at 673; Samonek, 527 N.W.2d at
26; Jones & Laughlin, 483 N.W.2d at 419; Wolverine Tower Assocs. v. City of Ann Arbor, 293
N.W.2d 669, 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
43. Meadowlanes, 473 N.W.2d at 643. See also Jones & Laughlin, 483 N.W.2d at 419.
44. INT’L ASSOC. OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON MASS APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY
9 (2013).
45. See Meadowlanes, 473 N.W.2d at 642, 651. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1)
(2017); Great Lakes Div., 576 N.W.2d at 674, 678–79.
46. Antisdale, 362 N.W.2d at 638 (“The most obvious deficiency in using the sales price of a
piece of property as conclusive evidence of its value is that the ultimate sales price of the property, as a
result of many factors, personal to the parties or otherwise, might not be its ‘usual’ price.”). See also
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Republic Twp., 163 N.W. 90, 93 (Mich. 1917); Great Lakes Div., 576
N.W.2d at 679; Samonek, 527 N.W.2d at 26.
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reduces the likelihood that factors extrinsic to the properties will impact
price calculations.47
In addition to having a robust sample of properties, the law requires
assessors to include only arm’s length transactions—which is when there is
a willing buyer and a willing seller and, thus, the sale price reflects the
demand and supply for property in the market.48 There is, however, an
exception for instances where auctions are the “common method of
acquisition” for properties in the area.49 Although our data show that
auctions have become a common method of acquisition, our estimates rely
only on arm’s length transactions so that they are as conservative as
possible. Consequently, we use arm’s length residential sales transactions
alongside assessment data to determine whether Detroit is complying with
the state constitutional mandate to assess each property at no more than 50
percent of its market value.50
B. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION’S ASSESSMENT PROVISION:
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS
Several state constitutions require property tax assessments to be
uniform and equitable.51 But, by requiring that assessed value/market value
ratio not exceed 0.5, Michigan’s constitution is one of the few to use an
explicit assessment ratio to constrain its local governments. Our review of

47. Antisdale, 362 N.W.2d at 638 (“The market approach to value has the capacity to cure this
deficiency because evidence of the sales prices of a number of comparable properties, if sufficiently
similar, supports the conclusion that factors extrinsic to the properties have not entered into the value
placed on the properties by the parties.”).
48. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1); Antisdale, 362 N.W.2d at 637; Jones & Laughlin, 483
N.W.2d at 419 (“The market approach is the only valuation method that directly reflects the balance of
supply and demand for property in marketplace trading.”); Teledyne Cont’l Motors v. Muskegon Twp.,
378 N.W.2d 590, 593. See also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he market value must be estimated. In respect of each item of property that value may be deemed
to be the sum which, considering all the circumstances, could have been obtained for it; that is, the
amount that in all probability would have been arrived at by fair negotiations between an owner willing
to sell and a purchaser desiring to buy. In making that estimate there should be taken into account all
considerations that fairly might be brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such
bargaining.”).
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1) (“As used in this act, ‘true cash value’ means the usual
selling price at the place where the property to which the term is applied is at the time of assessment,
being the price that could be obtained for the property at private sale, and not at auction sale except as
otherwise provided in this section, or at forced sale. The usual selling price may include sales at public
auction held by a nongovernmental agency or person if those sales have become a common method of
acquisition in the jurisdiction for the class of property being valued.”); Samonek, 527 N.W.2d at 27.
50. See Jones & Laughlin, 483 N.W.2d at 419 (“[E]vidence of the price at which an item of
property actually sold is most certainly relevant evidence of its value at an earlier time . . . .”).
51. See supra note 1.
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every state constitution shows that Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Tennessee are the only other states to
constitutionally require localities to assess properties at a specified fraction
of their market value.52 Given that these types of constitutional provisions
are uncommon, how did this cap on assessed values end up in the Michigan
constitution?
The historical evidence suggests Michigan’s constitutional drafters
feared that without a specific constitutional provision, localities would
abuse their powers and inequitably assess properties. One delegate from the
1962 constitutional convention—which was charged with drafting
Michigan’s current state constitution, enacted in 1963—wrote, “[w]ell,
52. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18B (“The classifications of property subject to ad valorem
taxation and the percentage of fair market value applicable to each classification for the purpose of
determining assessed valuation are as follows: 1. Land 10%; 2. Improvements for residential purposes
10%; 3. Electric cooperative properties, excluding land 15%; 4. Public service properties; excluding
land 25%; 5. Other property 15%.”); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 112 (“The assessed value of property shall
be a percentage of its true value, which shall be known as its assessment ratio. The assessment ratio on
each class of property as defined herein shall be uniform throughout the state upon the same class of
property, provided that the assessment ratio of any one (1) class of property shall not be more than three
(3) times the assessment ratio on any other class of property. For purposes of assessment for ad valorem
taxes, taxable property shall be . . . assessed at a percentage of its true value as follows: Class I. Singlefamily, owner-occupied, residential real property, at ten percent (10%) of true value; Class II. All other
real property, except for real property included in Class I or IV, at fifteen percent (15%) of true value;
Class III. Personal property, except for motor vehicles and for personal property included in Class IV, at
fifteen percent (15%) of true value; Class IV. Public utility property, which is property owned or used
by public service corporations required by general laws to be appraised and assessed by the state or the
county, excluding railroad and airline property and motor vehicles, at thirty percent (30%) of true
value . . . .”); N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 1A (“Except as provided in Subsection B of this section, taxes
levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and
uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class. Different methods may be provided by law to
determine value of different kinds of property, but the percentage of value against which tax rates are
assessed shall not exceed thirty-three and one-third percent.”); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 8 (“Real
property shall not be assessed for ad valorem taxation at a value less than eleven percent (11%) nor
greater than thirteen and one-half percent (13.5%) of its fair cash value for the highest and best use for
which such property was actually used . . . .”); OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11(1) (“For the tax year beginning
July 1, 1997, each unit of property in this state shall have a maximum assessed value for ad valorem
property tax purposes that does not exceed the property’s real market value for the tax year beginning
July 1, 1995, reduced by 10 percent.”); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the
same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied
and collected under general laws.”); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28 (“Real property shall be classified into
four (4) subclassifications and assessed as follows: (a) Public Utility Property, to be assessed at fiftyfive (55%) percent of its value; (b) Industrial and Commercial Property, to be assessed at forty (40%)
percent of its value; (c) Residential Property, to be assessed at twenty-five (25%) percent of its value,
provided that residential property containing two (2) or more rental units is hereby defined as industrial
and commercial property; and (d) Farm Property, to be assessed at twenty-five (25%) percent of its
value.”); UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“[A]ll tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the
laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in
proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law . . . .”).
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there was very widespread distrust of the Legislature and people said,
‘leave it up to the Legislature and nothing will be done or it will not be
done right. Let’s put it right in the Constitution and then we know the
matter will be taken care of.’”53 Thus, the very purpose of the Michigan
Constitution’s explicit mandate that property tax assessments cannot
exceed 50 percent of a property’s market value was to prevent local
governments from abusing their discretionary powers.54
Michigan’s prior (1908) constitution required localities to assess all
properties at full cash value,55 but according to Barlowe:
Wide variations exist in the extent to which assessors abide by this
provision. Assessment data studies conducted in recent years show that
some properties are assessed at as little as two per cent of their market
values while others are sometimes assessed at more than their full market
sale values. Township, city, and county equalized assessments frequently
represent levels of between 30 and 50 per cent of cash value.56

The issue of assessment inequity was so important that the governor, John
Swainson, filed a report at the 1962 constitutional convention, detailing the
unanimous findings of his Special Commission on Industrial Development
Legislation: assessments varied widely and resulted in non-uniform
property taxes that ultimately deterred investment.57
To address the well-documented assessment inequities, the Committee
on Finance and Taxation introduced an amendment at the convention.58
53. JAMES K. POLLOCK, MAKING MICHIGAN’S NEW CONSTITUTION, 1961–1962, at 49 (1962).
54. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
55. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. X, § 7 (“All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on
property at its cash value.”). According to a preparatory report, “[t]his provision was carried over from
Section 12 of Article XIV of the Constitution of 1850.” RALEIGH BARLOWE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMM’N, TAXATION AND FISCAL POLICY IN THE MICHIGAN
CONSTITUTION 5 (1961).
56. BARLOWE, supra note 55, at 5.
57. Letter from John B. Swainson, Governor of Mich., to Stephen S. Nisbit, President, Mich.
Constitutional Convention (Jan. 31, 1962), in STATE OF MICH., JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, No. 70, at 442, 442 (1962) (“It was the unanimous finding of the Committee that an
unhealthy lack of uniformity in property taxation exists in Michigan and the primary basis for this
condition is the wide variation of assessments. . . . [I]t is impossible under these conditions to assure an
industry seeking to settle in this state that it will be treated equitably in the matter of property taxes. The
training, technique, and skill of the assessor are so varied in this state that in some instances it has been
a deterrent to new industry. Dr. Harvey E. Brazer, of the University of Michigan, an eminent authority
in this field, has stated that a study of a typical Michigan county revealed that some properties were
assessed at less than 2% of market value, and others were assessed as high as 175% of their sales price.
In one of our large metropolitan counties we have witnessed the practice of assessing inventories at
80% of book value, machinery and equipment at 100% of depreciated value, and real property assessed
at 50% of current value.”).
58. The 50 percent limit was introduced at the convention by the Committee on Finance and

278

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:263

According to the Committee, the state’s 1908 constitutional provision
allowed the court to “simply state that since the former taxpayer is not
assessed in excess of 100%, the Constitution affords no basis for relief.
This unavailability of judicial relief has made the cash value standard a
positive impediment to the achievement of uniform assessment.”59
Consequently, the Committee drafted an amendment explicitly stating that
property assessments were not to exceed 50 percent of the property’s
market value.60 The committee suggested that 50 percent was the
appropriate limit because it was “currently used by the State Tax
Commission,” and it said that the standard was not unduly inflexible
because the legislature would still have the ability to “change the standard
to reflect changes in the general price structure.”61 The committee set the
start date for this provision in 1966, as an acknowledgment that some
jurisdictions currently relied on assessments above 50 percent.62
A minority faction disagreed with the 50 percent limit and crafted a
counter-amendment to delete it. 63 The faction’s critique of the 50 percent
limit was based on issues of sufficient revenue for local governments, the
proper role of the legislature, and the effectiveness of the 50 percent limit
in actually providing relief to taxpayers. First, the minority report predicted
“devastating immediate effect on the fiscal affairs of some communities.”64
Second, the minority report argued that setting a fixed limit to assessment
levels was not the role of the constitutional convention: “The inclusion of
an arbitrary 50% limitation, statutory in nature, does not have the dignity of
a mandate of the people, as does the sales tax rate limitation, expressed in a
referendum.”65 Third, the report argued that the 50 percent level did not
make practical sense. Its authors argued that just because the State Tax
Commission had used 50 percent as the proper assessment level when
equalizing taxes among units of government did not mean that assessments

Taxation on January 31, 1962. Committee Proposal No. 51, STATE OF MICH., JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, No. 69, at 404, 404 (1962).
59. Id. at 405.
60. Id. at 404 (“The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule governing the general ad
valorem taxation of real property and tangible personal property. The Legislature shall provide by law
for the determination of true cash value of such property and shall specify the proportion of true cash
value at which such property shall be uniformly assessed, which shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed
50 per cent, and shall provide by law for a system of equalization of assessments.”).
61. Id. at 405.
62. Id.
63. Minority Report on Committee Proposal No. 51, STATE OF MICH., JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, No. 73, at 523, 523 (1962).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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should now be limited to 50 percent.66 The report’s authors also argued that
while using a 50 percent limit would reduce taxes for some individuals and
industries, it would increase taxes for others because all assessments would
be brought closer to 50 percent in an attempt to make up for the lost
revenue.67 The counter-amendment, however, was handily defeated 84 to
43.68
Today, Detroit cannot continue to ignore the clear and unequivocal
limit on assessments, which withstood vigorous democratic debate to earn
its place in the Michigan Constitution.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence estimates that Detroit
properties are subject to effective tax rates of 3.82%, more than double the
national urban average of 1.5%.69 Given Detroit’s notoriety for high
property tax rates, there have been several studies examining this.70 We,
however, specifically build upon studies exploring assessment inequity in
Detroit because our goal is to determine whether the city is complying with
its state constitutional mandate to assess properties at no more than 50
percent of their market values.71 For example, several economists have
examined assessment inequity among Detroit residents using assessment
and market data from 2010.72 They observed severe over-assessment and
66. Id. at 522–23.
67. Id. at 523.
68. On February 8, 1962, the convention as a whole voted to send the provision to the Committee
on Style and Drafting. Delegate Chard Austin unsuccessfully proposed to remove the 50 percent
language on that day: “Amend page 1, line 13, after ‘assessed’ by striking out the comma and ‘which
shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50 per cent.’” Amendment No. 2, STATE OF MICH., JOURNAL OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, No. 75, at 557, 557 (1962).
69. LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY & MINN. CTR. FOR FISCAL EXCELLENCE, 50-STATE
PROPERTY TAX COMPARISON STUDY FOR TAXES PAID IN 2016, at 2, 18 fig.2 (2017),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/50-state-property-tax-comparison-for-2016-full.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Gary Sands et al., Implementing Tax Abatements in Michigan: A Study of Best
Practices, 20 ECON. DEV. Q. 44, 46–48 (2006); Gary Sands & Mark Skidmore, Making Ends Meet:
Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit, 36 J. URB. AFF. 682, 682–83, 691–98 (2013) (offering
reform options for current property tax policies that do not raise sufficient revenues for the City of
Detroit); Michael Simoni, Tuning up the Motor City: The Viability of Restructuring Detroit’s
Oppressive Property Tax System Within the Boundaries of Michigan’s Constitution, 51 WAYNE L. REV.
1309, 1320–23 (2005) (proposing a new reading of Proposal A, a ballot initiative to cap the maximum
assessment). See generally Samuel J. McKim III, Is Michigan’s Ad Valorem Property Tax Becoming
Obsolete?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 655 (2000); Timothy R. Hodge et al., The Land Value Gradient
in a (Nearly) Collapsed Urban Real Estate Market (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No.
WP15TH1, 2015) (arguing that peripheral neighborhoods are important to the property tax base).
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. See id. Even when examining the same years as Hodge et al., however, we do not expect our
numbers to be identical because Hodge et al. transform their collected assessed values by multiplying
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regressivity at levels not previously observed in the United States.73 In
addition, Dewar et al. compared assessed values and sales prices in one
Detroit neighborhood, Morningside, from 2008 to 2013.74 They found that
although market values declined over this period, assessments did not keep
pace.75 They also found that lower-valued homes were more likely than
higher-valued homes to be significantly over-assessed during this period.76
Unlike the existing literature, our study provides a dynamic view of
property tax inequity across all Detroit neighborhoods over a seven-year
period, and we discuss the legality of the inequities we observe. In doing
so, we make three unique contributions to the existing literature. First, we
examine how assessment inequity has changed through time for the entire
City of Detroit. Second, in response to prior evidence of over-assessment,77
Detroit’s assessment office tried to remedy this by implementing
assessment decreases for two consecutive years, resulting in planned
assessment reductions of 5 to 20 percent for select districts each year.78 We

each value by two. Therefore, they expected their ratios to equal 1 while we expect ours to equal 0.5.
See Hodge et al., Assessment Inequity, supra note 5, at 245 n.11.
73. The PRD for Hodge et al.’s full sample was 2.68, exceeding the International Association of
Assessing Officers’ (“IAAO”) upper limit of 1.03 and indicating regressivity. The COD was 109.55,
again exceeding the IAAO’s acceptable range of 5 to 15 and indicating very low uniformity. Each
quintile displayed horizontal inequity with mean values greater than 0.5, as well as regressivity and
vertical inequity as lower value properties were more over-assessed (on average) than higher value
properties. Hodge et al., Assessment Inequity, supra note 5, at 247 n.13. See also infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
74. See STABILIZING MORNINGSIDE 47–49 & fig.3.8 (2015), https://taubmancollege.umich.edu/
sites/default/files/files/mup/capstones/2015_Stabilizing-MorningSide.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id at 48–49 & figs.3.9 & 3.10. The study does not include any of the IAAO recommended
statistics such as PRD and COD.
77. After initial studies from Hodge et al. and the media attention their work received, the State
Tax Commission intervened in 2013 and issued a sample of reassessments in Detroit. See Christine
MacDonald, Detroit’s Property Tax System Plagued by Mistakes, Waste, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 22,
2013, at A1; Christine MacDonald, Michigan’s Tax Board to Investigate Whether Detroit is Overtaxing
Property Owners, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 8, 2013, at A1. Shortly after these articles went to print, the
City of Detroit announced it would reassess all property. The reassessments were completed in 2017.
Christine Ferretti, Property Taxes Going down for Over Half of Detroiters, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 23,
2017, 11:05 A.M.), http://detne.ws/2kjSFKb (“The Duggan administration unveiled the proposed 2017
property assessments on the heels of the first parcel-by-parcel reappraisal of the city’s nearly 255,000
residential properties in 60 years.”).
78. Matt Helms, Detroiters to See Property Assessment up to 20% Lower, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Jan. 28, 2015, 11:39 A.M.), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/01/28/
detroit-property-tax-assessments-reduced/22464209; Christine MacDonald & Christine Ferretti, Detroit
Assessments to Fall 5–20 Percent, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:38 A.M.), http://detne.ws/2b4hcyz
(“Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan announced Wednesday that residential property assessment citywide
will decline 5 to 20 percent, the second consecutive year he’s cut taxes. The change is in addition to last
year’s assessment reductions of up to 20 percent.”).
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examine whether systemic assessment inequity persisted despite these
reductions. Third, we examine how Detroit’s inflated assessments
contravene the Michigan Constitution.
The International Association of Assessing Officers (“IAAO”)79 has
outlined the appropriate methods for analyzing assessment accuracy, and
there are two major components: level and uniformity.80 Level refers to the
overall assessment ratio, defined as a property’s assessed value divided by
its market value.81 Two key statistics for analyzing assessment ratios are
the mean and median.82 Given Michigan’s constitutional requirement that
assessments should not be greater than 50 percent of market value, the
mean and median levels of assessment are expected to be no higher than
0.5.83 If the ratios derived are consistently higher than 0.5, then this is
reliable evidence that assessments in Detroit are systematically illegal, and
the assessing officials must take corrective action.
In contrast, uniformity (also known as variability) refers to the degree
to which assessment ratios have achieved horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity means that properties similarly situated in terms of
market value and type of neighborhood have similar assessment ratios,
while vertical equity means that higher and lower priced properties have
similar assessment ratios.84 Horizontal and vertical inequity occur when
assessment ratios vary widely. There are two methods for analyzing
assessment uniformity: the Coefficient of Dispersion (“COD”) and the
Price Related Differential (“PRD”).85 The COD measures horizontal equity
79. The IAAO is a nonprofit, educational, and research association that is comprised of
government assessment officials and others interested in the administration of the property tax. The
IAAO’s main role is to promote standardized practices for assessing property and monitoring
assessment performance. About Home, IAAO, http://www.iaao.org/wcm/About/wcm/About_Us_
Content/About_Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
80. See INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON RATIO STUDY 7 (2013) [hereinafter
IAAO].
81. Id.
82. The mean is calculated by adding all assessment ratios together and dividing by the total
number of ratios. The median is the middle ratio in an uneven number of ratios ordered by magnitude,
or the average of the two central ratios in an even number of ordered ratios. The median is less affected
by extreme outliers than the mean. Id. at 13.
83. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
84. See IAAO, supra note 80, at 13–14, 28–29; Hodge et al., Assessment Inequity, supra note 5,
at 241.
85. We recognize other IAAO-recommended measures for analyzing assessments exist,
including price-related bias, weighted mean, median absolute deviation, and regression analysis. See
IAAO, supra note 80, at 12–14. However, we have presented the traditional assessment performance
statistics highlighted in the IAAO’s publication, id., and used in other papers analyzing assessment
ratios. See, e.g., Hodge et al, Assessment Inequity, supra note 5, at 241; Krupa, supra note 2, at 565–69;
Daniel P. McMillen, Assessment Regressivity: A Tale of Two Illinois Counties, LAND LINES, January
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by quantifying the degree to which the assessment ratios deviate from the
median.86 The IAAO considers assessments uniform if the COD is between
5 and 15 for single-family residential properties.87 The PRD is a measure of
vertical equity. If high-value properties have lower ratios than low-value
properties, the vertical inequity is termed regressive; if the opposite occurs,
it is called progressive. Assessments should be neither regressive nor
progressive because—although a degree of variation between ratios is
expected as well as accepted—large differences result in the non-uniform
and inequitable application of property tax assessments.88 The PRD is
calculated by dividing the mean ratio by the weighted mean ratio (the total
assessed value of all property divided by the total sale price).89 According
to the IAAO, PRDs between 0.98 and 1.03 are vertically equitable while
values greater than 1.03 are regressive, and values less than 0.98 are
progressive.90
Beyond the IAAO’s standard measures, a simple approach for
examining horizontal and vertical equity is to estimate the mean, median,
minimum, and maximum assessment ratios across sale price quintiles.91
This allows further analysis within a quintile (horizontal equity) and an
examination of how ratios vary across quintiles (vertical equity). In
Michigan, if the mean and median are less than or equal to 0.5 within a
quintile, then horizontal equity is present and the assessments are
systematically constitutional. If mean and median assessment ratios are no
higher than 0.5 across quintiles, then the assessments are vertically
equitable and constitutional.92
2011, at 10–12.
86. As outlined in the IAAO’s publication for analyzing assessment accuracy, the COD is
calculated as follows: “1. subtract the median from each ratio; 2. take the absolute value of the
calculated differences; 3. sum the absolute differences; 4. divide by the number of ratios to obtain the
average absolute deviation; 5. divide by the median; and 6. multiply by 100.” IAAO, supra note 80, at
13 (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 17 tbl.1-3.
88. Id. at 14–15.
89. While the median and mean give equal weight to each parcel in the sample, the weighted
mean gives equal weight to each dollar. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 14, 17 tbl.1-3.
91. Quintiles are determined by dividing the data into five equal groups according to a variable
(e.g. sale prices). See Hodge et al, Assessing Inequity, supra note 5, at 247 n.13.
92. We also recognize non-descriptive techniques to analyze vertical and horizontal inequity
exist. Particularly, regression analysis has been the standard method for deriving causal inference with
the inclusion of various control variables. For studies using alternate regression specifications for
examining vertical inequity, see generally Earl J. Bell, Administrative Inequity and Property
Assessment: The Case for the Traditional Approach, 3 PROP. TAX J. 123 (1984); Pao Lun Cheng,
Property Taxation, Assessment Performance, and Its Measurement, 29 PUB. FIN. 269 (1974); John M.
Clapp, A New Test for Equitable Real Estate Tax Assessment, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 233 (1990);
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Our proposed method of analysis is called an assessment ratio study
(also known as ratio study or sales ratio study), which is the primary
mechanism that assessors, taxpayers, appeal boards, and taxing authorities
use to determine if assessments meet the legal requirements of a
jurisdiction.93 IAAO defines an assessment ratio study as “a form of
applied statistics, because the analyst draws conclusions about the appraisal
of the population (the entire jurisdiction) of properties based only on those
that have sold during a given time period.”94 If the unsold parcels are
appraised in the same manner as the sold ones, then it is valid to use the
statistics derived from the sales ratio study to infer appraisal performance
for unsold parcels. Our evidence shows that homes selling during the
period under study are comparable to homes that did not sell. For example,
the average age of all improved, taxable, residential property was 81.46
years, and the average age of our trimmed 2015 sample was 81.61 years.
III. DATA ANALYSIS
Since assessments in Detroit are calculated annually and are based on
property values from the previous year, we divided assessed values with
prior year sales information to produce assessment ratios. That is, we match
assessment data from each year (2009–2015) with sales data from the prior
year (2008–2014). For properties that were sold multiple times in the same
calendar year, we took the last sale in a year as the determinant of the
property’s value. As a result, the full dataset includes 123,400 residential
property transactions (we exclude empty lots and non-taxable properties).
The breakdown of data by year can be viewed in column (1) of Table 2.
Data Driven Detroit provided parcel-level information on assessed values

Levis A. Kochin & Richard W. Parks, Vertical Equity in Real Estate Assessment: A Fair Appraisal, 20
ECON. INQUIRY 511 (1982); Morton Paglin & Michael Fogarty, Equity and the Property Tax: A New
Conceptual Focus, 25 NAT’L TAX J. 557 (1972); Ronald W. Spahr & Mark A. Sunderman, Property
Tax Inequities on Ranch and Farm Properties, 74 LAND ECON. 374 (1998). For studies using alternate
regressions with emphasis on horizontal inequity, see generally Marcus T. Allen & William H. Dare,
Identifying Determinants of Horizontal Property Tax Inequity: Evidence from Florida, 24 J. REAL EST.
RES. 153 (2002); Brian J.L. Berry & Robert S. Bednarz, A Hedonic Model of Prices and Assessments
for Single-Family Homes: Does the Assessor Follow the Market or the Market Follow the Assessor?, 51
LAND ECON. 21 (1975); William C. Goolsby, Assessment Error in the Valuation of Owner-Occupied
Housing, 13 J. REAL EST. RES. 33 (1997). Although these regression techniques are not the focus of this
paper, since we examine assessments through the standards set forth by the IAAO, we have analyzed
each technique using various functional forms. Results are available upon request. Our findings are
consistent with the results presented in this paper: vertical and horizontal inequity is present as lowervalue properties are consistently over-assessed.
93. IAAO, supra note 80, at 7.
94. Id. at 8.
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for all Detroit properties from 2009 to 2014.95 We used the City of
Detroit’s Open Data Portal to secure data on all property sales in Detroit
from 2008 through 2014, as well as assessed values for 2015.96
TABLE 2. Number of Observations by Year of Sale
Year

All Sales

Trimmed Arm’s
Length Sales
(3)

% Trimmed

(1)

Arm’s
Length Sales
(2)

2008

21,084

2,626

2,602

0.91%

2009

17,671

1,437

1,412

1.74%

2010

16,259

230

219

4.78%

2011

14,942

261

259

0.77%

2012

18,656

678

676

0.29%

2013

18,739

495

482

2.63%

2014

16,049

459

453

1.31%

Total

123,400

6,186

6,103

1.34%

(4)

NOTE: Data sources are discussed supra in notes 95–96 and infra in text accompanying notes 97 & 100.

For several reasons, we excluded 117,214 observations from the
sample, leaving a total of 6,186 arm’s length property transactions in our
analysis (column (2) of Table 2). First, our dataset included twenty-two
different sales terms defined by the assessor’s office, and we excluded
properties that were not arm’s length transactions.97 Although the law
states that only arm’s length transactions should be included, there is an
exception if non-arm’s length transactions (distressed sales) “have become
a common method of acquisition in the jurisdiction for the class of property
being valued.”98 Given that only about 5 percent of sales from 2008–2014
were arm’s length transactions (see Table 2), there is a strong argument that
95. Data Driven Detroit (D3) is a Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) focused on
providing access to information about and analyses for Detroit and the surrounding region. See About,
DATA DRIVEN DETROIT, https://datadrivendetroit.org/about (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
96. Detroit’s Open Data Portal provides access to public data and information about city
governments and service delivery. See About Detroit Open Data, CITY DETROIT,
https://data.detroitmi.gov/about (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). The Portal’s data tables are continually
updated; data as used in this Article is on file with the authors.
97. Non-arm’s length transactions excluded from our study comprise the following sales terms:
“bank sale,” “city sale,” “county land bank sale,” “court order,” “government transfer,” “HUD,” “land
bank,” “land contract,” “create trust,” “multiple parcels,” “NEZ,” “NQ,” “death cert/estate,” “deed in
lieu of FCL,” “deed of personal rep,” “family sale,” “review needed,” “sheriff/tax deed,” “investor
sale,” “to bank,” and “to investor.”
98. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1) (2017).
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distressed sales are, in fact, the common method of acquisition for
residential properties in Detroit. Nevertheless, we only include arm’s length
transactions so that our estimates provide the most conservative measure of
unconstitutionality. Scholars who include distressed sales in their analysis
will only find unconstitutionality that is markedly more pronounced
because these transactions involve smaller sums.99
Second, we excluded properties that were bundled and sold as a single
transaction because it is impossible to determine the price of any single
property within the bundle. Bundled properties are different parcels with
identical sellers, sale dates, and sale prices.100 Third, we excluded
properties that had a sale price of zero because it is unlikely that these were
arm’s length transactions; we also excluded properties with an assessed
value equal to zero because these are likely to be non-taxable properties.
Although excluding 95 percent of the total observations may seem
extreme, this is a result of the forced auctions and other non-arm’s length
transactions that have proliferated in Detroit’s distressed real estate market.
In addition, we further trimmed the data in accordance with IAAO’s
nationally recognized standards, which recommend trimming the sample of
statistical outliers because very low or high ratios can severely distort the
analysis.101 We show the total observations after trimming in column (3) of
99. The estimates of illegality increase substantially when non-arm’s length transactions are
included. For instance, the median assessment ratio when only arm’s length transactions are included
versus when non-arm’s length transactions are included: 2009 (0.79 vs. 2.69), 2010 (1.95 vs. 4.13),
2011 (0.52 vs. 2.79), 2012 (0.69 vs. 3.85), 2013 (0.91 vs. 5.41), 2014 (1.04 vs. 2.88), 2015 (.69 vs.
2.32). Mean assessment ratios are even more severe when non-arm’s length transactions are included,
ranging from 2,100 to 4,300 vs. 0.53 to 3.44. See infra Table 3.
100. It may seem reasonable to assign a portion of the total price to each property based on the
parcel’s size and characteristics; however, unobserved factors may prevent this split from accurately
representing each property. For example, a parcel with a larger house and lot may be expected to have a
higher value, but the house may be in worse condition than a smaller property it is bundled with, and
thus should not automatically be granted a higher price.
101. The IAAO defines an outlier as an assessment ratio below the first quartile or above the third
quartile by 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR), where the IQR is the difference between the first and
third quartiles. The first quartile is the median value of the lower half of the data and the third quartile is
the median value of the upper half of the data (the second quartile is the median of the entire dataset).
The IAAO also recognizes that ratio distributions are often skewed to the right (i.e., a greater number of
high ratios may be present), so to prevent dropping a disproportionate number of high ratios, the IAAO
suggests taking the logarithm of each assessment ratio prior to trimming the outliers. IAAO, supra note
80, at 12, 53. The steps for trimming outliers are: (1) locate the first quartile (i.e., median value of the
lower half of the data); (2) locate the third quartile (i.e., median value of the upper half of the data); (3)
compute the interquartile range (IQR) and multiply by 1.5 = (Step 2 – Step 1) x 1.5; (4) establish the
lower boundary = (Step 1 – Step 3); (5) establish the upper boundary = (Step 2 + Step 3). Id. Again, our
results represent conservative estimates because they only increase when we include non-trimmed
transactions. Here are the mean assessment ratios when only trimmed arm’s length transactions are
included vs. when non-trimmed arm’s length transactions are included: 2009 (2.52 vs. 3.52), 2010 (3.44
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Table 2, and the percentage of trimmed observations in column (4). The
number of observations we excluded from our sample due to outlier
trimming is below the IAAO’s recommended standard of 10 percent.102
Table 3 shows the mean and median assessment ratios; the COD and
PRD, which measure the uniformity and variability of the ratios; and the
average sale prices for each year, highlighting changing market conditions.
We also include the percentage of assessment ratios that are above the 0.5
constitutional limit to evaluate the quantity of unconstitutionally assessed
properties. Table 3 provides substantial evidence that Detroit assessors are
unconstitutionally assessing properties in a systematic fashion. First, for
properties sold between 2008 and 2014, the majority of assessments
violated the Michigan Constitution: 2009 (65%); 2010 (84%); 2011 (53%);
2012 (73%); 2013 (78%); 2014 (83%); 2015 (65%). Second, data from the
assessment ratio study—which is required for making inferences about
properties that were not sold during the period—show that the mean and
median assessment ratios are greater than the constitutionally permitted
ratio of 0.5.103 While the 2011 and 2012 ratios are closer to 0.5, they
remain statistically larger than 0.5 when the margin of error is set at the
95% confidence level. Third, the COD for each year is much higher than
the recommended maximum of 15, which is evidence that assessments are
not uniform. In addition, the PRD for each year is above 1.03, which is
evidence of regressivity (i.e., higher-valued properties have lower ratios
than lower-valued properties).104 Again, we see the COD and PRD for
2011 and 2012 are closer to the recommended levels, yet remain above it.
Upon examining Table 3, one question remains: Why are 2011 and
2012 closer to the constitutionally permitted ratio of 0.5 while in the other
observed years the ratios suggest even greater unconstitutionality? We
provide two potential explanations. For one, the assessor classified fewer
sales as arm’s length transactions in 2011 and 2012: it classified 1.7% and
3.6% of the total number of transactions as arm’s length for 2011 and 2012,
respectively, whereas it classified between 2.6% and 12.4% of transactions
as arm’s length in the other years. Second, median sale prices derived from
the assessor’s data are much higher in 2011 and 2012 compared with the
surrounding years. More importantly, the assessor’s sales data from 2011
and 2012 are not consistent with sales information from Zillow market data
vs. 5.59), 2011 (0.53 vs. 40.20), 2013 (1.57 vs. 1.65), 2014 (1.73 vs. 4.18), 2015 (1.28 vs. 60.74).
102. See id. at 54.
103. See supra Part II.
104. See supra notes 86 & 89 and accompanying text (explaining the process for calculating COD
and PRD).
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in these years, despite consistency between the two data sets in the other
years.105 To check our two explanations, we did a separate analysis that
included sales labeled as “Review Needed,” a sales term used for
transactions that the assessor did not have enough information to classify,
and the number of observations and the average sale prices became
consistent with the surrounding years; in addition, the average sales prices
for 2011 and 2012 became consistent with Zillow market data. With the
stated correction, the average assessment ratios would increase to 3.65 and
4.90 for 2011 and 2012, respectively, suggesting there was substantial
unconstitutionality in 2011 and 2012.106
Table 3 also provides mixed results concerning the across-the-board
assessment reductions discussed by Mayor Duggan.107 There is no evidence
of cuts in 2014 because the mean ratio increased by 10 percent.
Furthermore, vertical inequity worsened as the PRD increased in 2014,
while the COD declined only slightly. However, overall assessment ratios
declined in 2015 by approximately 26 percent, resulting in reductions that
were larger, on average, than the 5 to 20 percent reduction the mayor
expected.108 Despite the large reductions, vertical inequity persisted as the
PRD remained above 1.03 (at 2.45), and horizontal inequity actually
worsened as the COD increased to 125.36 (up from 107.34).
TABLE 3. Assessment Ratio Statistics by Year
Year

Mean

Median

COD

PRD

Median Sale Price %>0.5

N

2009

2.52*

0.79

265.89

3.66

$36,000

0.65

2602

2010

3.44*

1.95

133.08

3.14

$15,000

0.84

1412

2011

0.53*

0.52

29.24

1.09

$48,000

0.53

219

2012

0.90*

0.69

60.59

1.37

$29,900

0.73

259

2013

1.57*

0.91

115.29

2.12

$22,250

0.78

676

2014

1.73*

1.04

107.34

2.5

$15,657

0.83

482

2015

1.28*

0.69

125.36

2.45

$23,000

0.65

453

NOTE: * denotes the mean is statistically different from 0.5 at the 5% significance level. These statistics
are based on residential, taxable, non-bundled arm’s length transactions that have been trimmed for
outliers.
105. See infra Figure 1.
106. Other years experienced increases in mean assessment ratios when “Review Needed” sales
were included. However, they were not as drastic as the increases in 2011 and 2012.
107. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (regarding Detroit’s tax cuts).
108. The reduction is calculated by using the percentage change formula: [(new value–old
value)/old value]*100. In this case, the old value is 1.73 and the new value is 1.28. Therefore, [(1.28–
1.73)/1.73]*100 = [-0.45/1.73]*100 = [-0.26*100] = 26% decrease.
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To further explore assessment practices in Detroit, Table 4 provides
simple snapshots of how assessments vary within and across sale price
quintiles by showing the mean, median, minimum, and maximum
assessment ratios. We highlight the average sale price of each quintile in
the row labeled “Mean SP,” and the percent assessed above the
constitutional 0.5 limit is in the row labeled “%>0.5”. The most important
finding shown in Table 4 is that average assessment ratios decline as
property values increase. That is, Detroit’s assessors are unconstitutionally
assessing lower-valued properties by a substantial margin, while the
assessment ratios for higher-valued property are at or even below the
constitutionally permitted limit of 0.5. Specifically, the lowest-valued
properties in 2009 were, on average, assessed at levels almost eighteen
times larger than the constitutionally permitted 0.5 limit (8.87); middlevalued properties were assessed three times more than the constitutionally
permitted limit (1.54); and the highest-valued properties were assessed
below the constitutionally permitted limit (0.4). In addition to this stark
evidence of vertical inequity, assessment ratios are less uniform for lowervalued property (ranging from 0.25 to 36.29) compared with higher valued
property (ranging from 0.04 to 1.6), providing evidence of regressive
horizontal inequity. These results are generally consistent across all years;
however, for reasons mentioned earlier, 2011 and 2012 ratios are closer to
0.5.109
Table 4 further explores how Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan’s acrossthe-board reductions in property assessments—ranging from 5 percent to
20 percent, depending on the district—affected the ratios. Table 4 provides
some evidence of reductions in 2014, with mean assessment ratios
decreasing in quintiles 1, 2, and 5, while reductions were higher than the
mayor projected for 2015. Specifically, Table 4 shows reductions ranging
from 12% to 47% in 2015, depending on the quintile viewed.110 More
importantly, Table 4 shows that even after the reductions, the vast majority
of lower-valued properties had an average assessment ratio equal to 3.29,
not even close to the 0.5 level, while higher-valued properties—which
already had ratios closer to the constitutionally permitted limit of 0.5—
received reductions that brought assessments to an average ratio of 0.29. As
a result, for quintile 1, assessed values were, on average, $18,507 above the
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (suggesting that Detroit assessor’s office likely
miscategorized several arm’s length transactions in 2011 and 2012 as “Review Needed”). Only in 2012
are the highest-valued properties (quintile 5) above 0.5.
110. The decrease is more than the 20 percent decrease that Duggan authorized, in part due to our
sample, which captures only properties sold (a much smaller subset of the total number of residential
properties in each district).
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constitutional limit, a pattern repeated in quintiles 2 ($19,900), 3 ($13,796),
and 4 ($4,890). But quintile 5 was, on average, assessed below the
constitutional limit by $10,881.

2011

2010

2009

We use two specific properties to better illustrate how owners of
lower-valued properties are bearing the undue burden of unconstitutional
assessments. In the first example, the public record shows that a property
located at 15455 Artesian Street sold in 2009 for $10,000; the assessor
marked this sale as an arm’s length transaction. Nevertheless, the assessed
value of that property in 2010 was not $5,000 (50 percent of the property’s
market value), but rather $36,094, which is 7.2 times the constitutional
limit. In a contrasting example, the public record shows that, in 2008, a
property located at 4127 Buckingham Avenue sold for $115,000 in an
arm’s length transaction. The assessed value in 2009 was $41,369, which is
$16,131 below the constitutional limit.
TABLE 4. Assessment Ratio Statistics by Sale Price Quintile and Year
Quintile

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Median Sale
Price

>0.5%

1

8.87*

6.27

0.25

36.29

$4,000

1

2

2.98*

2.91

0.23

9.84

$11,450

0.98

3

1.54*

1.48

0.11

3.68

$23,000

0.92

4

0.64*

0.57

0.05

2.56

$53,000

0.61

5

0.4*

0.38

0.04

1.6

$99,000

0.18

1

7.74*

5.75

0.38

35.44

$4,475

1

2

2.74*

2.68

0.23

7.02

$11,000

0.98

3

1.31*

1.21

0.07

3.26

$23,000

0.9

4

0.7*

0.63

0.1

2.3

$48,069

0.73

5

0.4*

0.37

0.04

2.39

$88,500

0.19

1

0.52

0.56

0.18

0.79

$7,000

0.5

2

0.63

0.6

0.34

1.62

$12,000

0.69

3

0.59*

0.62

0.21

1.51

$24,900

0.68

4

0.54

0.54

0.15

1.88

$50,000

0.56

5

0.44*

0.43

0.07

0.81

$98,000

0.33

2015

2014

2013

2012
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Quintile

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Median Sale
Price

>0.5%

1

3.43*

1.63

0.5

11.67

$5,000

0.83

2

1.31*

0.85

0.27

3.35

$11,000

0.88

3

0.72*

0.71

0.2

2.1

$25,000

0.73

4

0.64*

0.67

0.14

1.19

$45,000

0.72

5

0.58

0.51

0.23

1.04

$123,919

0.5

1

5*

3.46

0.22

36.02

$5,000

0.96

2

1.67*

1.56

0.07

4.77

$11,000

0.97

3

0.92*

0.88

0.15

2.64

$24,000

0.81

4

0.59*

0.58

0.04

1.74

$48,950

0.56

5

0.5

0.5

0.14

0.87

$121,250

0.52

1

3.74*

2.51

0.3

34.32

$5,000

0.98

2

1.45*

1.35

0.03

3.87

$11,000

0.91

3

1*

0.95

0.23

2.34

$23,168

0.93

4

0.62*

0.59

0.08

1.86

$50,802

0.64

5

0.43*

0.42

0.05

0.94

$139,459

0.34

1

3.29*

2.16

0.31

23.8

$4,241

0.98

2

1.05*

0.93

0.25

3.23

$11,920

0.92

3

0.53

0.49

0.06

1.47

$24,175

0.49

4

0.39*

0.34

0.07

2.49

$45,461

0.18

5

0.29*

0.25

0.03

0.79

$153,881

0.11

NOTE: * indicates that the mean is statistically different from 0.5 at the 5 percent significance level.
These statistics include residential, taxable, non-bundled arm’s length transactions that have been
trimmed for outliers.

As a final mechanism for examining assessment trends in Detroit,
Table 5 highlights the changes in average assessment ratios across districts.
Because it is district specific, Table 5 is the one place we see evidence of
Mayor Duggan’s 2014 assessment reductions: District 2 (25%), District 3
(12%), District 7 (20%), District 9 (35%), and District 10 (24%). The
remaining districts experienced persistent over-assessment with no
correction. In 2015, assessments decreased between 10% and 69% for all
districts excluding District 8 (40% increase).111
111. See Mike Duggan, Mayor of Detroit, Address at a City of Detroit Press Conference (Jan. 28,
2015) (“As I said when I was campaigning, I felt like the assessments in this city were higher than the
actual sales price that people could sell their house for. We made a commitment to have honest
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In sum, we find that the Detroit assessor is systematically assessing
Detroit homeowners at levels that violate the Michigan Constitution. Even
though we argue that the 2011 and 2012 sales data were inconsistent,112 we
nevertheless find substantial unconstitutionality using this faulty data.
TABLE 5. Changes in Average Assessment Ratios by District, 2009–2015
Assessment
District

2009 to
2010

2010 to
2011

2011 to
2012

2012 to
2013

2013 to
2014

2014 to
2015

1

32.59%

-89.18%

20.18%

63.84%

247.42%

-68.87%

2

53.64%

-87.82%

221.58%

80.43%

-25.32%

-40.27%

3

72.53%

-81.03%

70.22%

63.39%

-12.25%

-34.48%

4

-21.64%

-67.60%

-9.98%

13.93%

131.11%

-37.07%

5

10.19%

-68.16%

9.86%

2.93%

129.73%

-33.68%

6

63.26%

-92.57%

193.04%

37.55%

19.03%

-22.82%

7

36.30%

-86.78%

201.02%

90.23%

-20.30%

-9.72%

8

16.84%

-84.12%

80.55%

59.85%

10.45%

39.96%

9

43.46%

-82.63%

51.51%

177.97%

-34.98%

-41.33%

10

12.70%

-74.48%

28.09%

101.14%

-24.16%

-32.46%

IV. FUTURE RESEARCH
The lingering question is: why has the Detroit assessor’s office
systematically violated the Michigan Constitution? Although this question
is beyond this Article’s scope, there are four possible answers. The first
hypothesis is that the assessor’s office lacked the capacity to conduct the
legally required market-based annual assessments,113 and thus new
assessments were based on non-market related, incremental adjustments to

assessments. Last year, you remember most Detroiters got assessment cuts between 10 and 20 percent
and we have embarked on a parcel by parcel assessment—the first one in fifty years—and that’s going
to be done at the end of 2016. We are assessing each individual home. We didn’t want to wait for that
parcel to parcel assessment to be done to continue to try to do the best we can to make sure our
assessments are accurate. And so we are again doing significant assessment cuts for 2015.”).
112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113. Among the stated goals of the assessor for the 2010–2011 fiscal year was to “assess at
statutory level of 50% all properties within the city of Detroit, . . . [c]onduct site reviews of the required
30% of all property annually; [and] field review, capture, and correctly value all real and personal
property within the jurisdiction . . . .” CITY OF DETROIT, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE
AUDIT OF THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENTS DIVISION JULY 2008–JUNE 2011, at 6–7 (2012),
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/Auditor%20General/Performance%20Audits/2012/Finance_A
ssessment_Performance_07-2008_06-2011.pdf.
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existing assessments.114 This makeshift method based on conjecture
became completely unworkable in 2008 when property values plummeted
in Detroit (See Figure 1) and the chasm between incrementally adjusted
home prices and actual home prices widened sharply. While the assessor
relied on Detroit residents to appeal incorrect assessments, research shows
that poor people are less likely to appeal their property tax assessments;
and when they do, they have lower success rates than wealthier people.115
FIGURE 1. Median Sale Price of Single Family Homes in Detroit
$90,000
$80,000
$70,000
$60,000
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NOTE: Data from Detroit Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/detroit-mi/homevalues (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).

The Auditor General’s Performance Audit shows that the Detroit
Assessor’s office lacked capacity to do its job properly. The report’s

114. See id. at 9 (“In the City’s electronic assessing system known as ‘Equalizer,’ a property is in
an ‘override status’ when its assessed value is input as a total amount, versus the system method of
calculating a value based on physical property attributes and other assessment criteria. The property’s
assessed value is ‘disconnected’ in the system. Assessed values in Equalizer are historical aggregate
amounts, which were transferred from the previous assessing system known as ‘IPDS’ (Integrated
Physical Data Systems): Of the 42 properties audited, 28 (66.7%) remain in override status; A
representative in the Assessments Division estimated that 92% of the City’s parcels 387,000 [sic]
remain in override status in Equalizer.”).
115. See Doerner and Ihlanfeldt, Representative Agents, supra note 20, at 60–61, 89. See also
Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2014) (“I find that
reducing property tax salience makes homeowners less likely to appeal their property-value
assessments, which makes it more likely that those homeowners will remain overassessed and
overtaxed. These overtaxed homeowners never perceive their injury and consequently never seek the
legal relief to which they might be entitled. I also find that property taxes are less salient for recent
homeowners with higher-priced mortgages, who are more likely to be racial minorities, immigrants, and
working families with children.”); Andrew T. Hayashi, Property Taxes and Their Limits: Evidence from
New York City, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 46 & tbl.1 (2014).
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authors state:
As a result of our audit, we have concluded that the overall operation of
the Assessments Division falls short of their goals and objectives.
Moreover, guided by the State Tax Commission’s 14-Point Local Unit
Review (of assessing units), we found that the Division’s assessing
operations are inefficient, ineffective, and lacking in some areas of its
assessing activities.116

The report’s findings are jaw dropping. For instance, auditors found
that about 1,700 properties were still classified as tax exempt although they
were no longer owned by the city.117 Also, according to a representative
from the Buildings, Safety Engineering and Environmental Department,
over 70 percent of the tickets this department issued for blight violations
were dismissed because the property ownership information it received
from the assessor was incorrect.118 In sum, the Auditor General’s report
paints the Detroit Assessor’s office as a highly incompetent, inefficient,
and broken bureaucracy, lacking the capacity to fulfill its mission.
The second hypothesis is that although there are various community
organizations working on the property tax foreclosure crisis, community
activists were unable to hold the Detroit assessor accountable because they
were unaware of the state constitutional provision or they did not have
access to the data and empirical skills necessary to prove systemic
unconstitutionality.
The third hypothesis is that it is easier for Detroit to raise revenues by
illegally assessing residents than by legally raising property tax rates. A
Michigan constitutional amendment—the 1978 Headlee Amendment—
requires voter approval for increases in property tax rates that go beyond
the Amendment’s guidelines.119 Given the property tax rate is already one
of the highest in the nation, it may be challenging to get voters to approve a
hike. In contrast, Wayne County reimburses Detroit for any property tax
revenue that it fails to collect; in exchange, the county receives the right to
collect the revenues (with penalties and interests) and to confiscate the
home if payment is not forthcoming after three years of delinquency.120
Without this arrangement, the Detroit officials would be incentivized to
legally assess residents, which would decrease revenues but increase the
probability that people would be able to afford their property taxes. With
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

CITY OF DETROIT, supra note 113, at 3.
See id. at 18.
Id. at 11.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 211.78(a), 211.87(b) (2017).
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this arrangement, the city has a short-term incentive to make assessments
high and extract as much money as possible to fill budget shortfalls, even
though this is not in the city’s long-term interest because tax foreclosure
devastates neighborhoods.
A fourth hypothesis is that even when the county does not make much
money from the foreclosure auction sales, the county makes significant
sums of money in late fees and interest, which is supposed to go into the
Delinquent Tax Revolving Fund.121 The Fund should be used solely for
foreclosures, but Wayne County has been using the Fund to fill its chronic
budget shortfalls and to recover from its recent financial emergency.122
Consequently, the financially distressed county has come to rely on
property tax foreclosures in Detroit to stay afloat.
These four hypotheses attempt to explain why Detroit has been
unconstitutionally assessing its residents, but they have not yet been
empirically confirmed or refuted. We leave this for other scholars to
investigate.
V. STATEGRAFT
The findings of the study are clear: The City of Detroit is assessing
homeowners in violation of the Michigan Constitution. More significantly,
city and county coffers have benefitted greatly from this theft. But, in many
ways, Detroit’s illicit actions are not unique. It is not unprecedented for
state agents to increase state revenues using illegal means, and we create
the term stategraft to describe this phenomenon.123 Stategraft is when state
121. Under Michigan’s Public Act 246 of 2003, the City of Detroit began participating in the
Delinquent Tax Revolving Fund (“DTRF”) in the 2003 tax year. Major Activities and Descriptions,
WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER, http://www.waynecounty.com/treasurer/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2018). Fees and interest are deposited in the DTRF, but surpluses are under the control of the county
board of commissions. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.87(b); Richard L. Baldermann, Mich. Dep’t of
Treasury Numbered Ltr. 2001-5, Delinquent Tax Revolving Funds Revisions to Accounting After
Public Act 123 of 1999 (Feb. 8, 2001), http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/1,1607,7-121-1751_21946024--,00.html. See also MICH. ASS’N OF CTY. TREASURERS, THE DELINQUENT TAX REVOLVING FUND
(2013), http://mactreasurers.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/13W_Delinquent.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Charles E. Ramirez, Treasurer Could Add $82M to Wayne Co.’s General Fund,
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015, 10:36 P.M.), http://detne.ws/1RGqeB8 (reporting that in 2015, Wayne
County’s treasurer recommended transferring $82 million from the DTRF to its general fund); Robert
Snell, Wayne County Poised to End Financial Emergency, Evans Says, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160301/NEWS/160229816/wayne-county-poised-to-endfinancial-emergency-evans-says (“Wayne County could emerge from a financial emergency later this
year after eliminating health care liabilities and an $82 million accumulated deficit, county Executive
Warren Evans said Tuesday. . . . Evans said he will ask the state treasurer soon to release Wayne
County from a consent agreement reached last year amid the county’s financial emergency.”).
123. Searching Google Scholar and JSTOR, we found only three authors using this term in the last
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agents transfer property from residents to the state in violation of the state’s
own laws and to the detriment of a vulnerable group. The term intentionally
combines the words statecraft and graft or corruption. A widely agreedupon definition of corruption is “[t]he abuse of an entrusted power for
private gain,”124 but stategraft is different because there is no private gain.
Instead, the abuse of state power primarily benefits the state itself.
Statecraft is the art of conducting state affairs,125 but stategraft highlights
hundred years; none defined or developed it. See Thomas P.M. Barnett, Big-War Thinking in a SmallWar Era: The Rise of the AirSea Battle Concept, 6 CHINA SECURITY 3, 4 (2010) (“And to the extent
that America eschews such responsibilities, other rising powers seeking to protect their expanding
network of economic interests will inevitably step into that void—albeit with less militarized delivery
systems. China may do so, but, as is now becoming apparent, it prefers stategraft to nation-building,
paying upfront from its sizeable cash coffers.”); Stephen S. Wise, The Return of Roosevelt, 191 N. AM.
REV. 738, 741–42 (1910) (“When, for example, the corrupt followers of the Quay-Stone régime in the
Keystone State desperately sought to avert the crushing defeat that even apathetic Pennsylvania seemed
ready to inflict upon its betrayers, these masters of Stategraft rather than Statecraft brazenly utilized the
name and prestige of Roosevelt in order to stave off the day of wrath.”); Art Buchwald, The Fine Points
of Stategraft, er, Statecraft, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at C3 (discussing U.S. foreign policy and using
“stategraft” in title only).
124. E.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM 91 (1999) (defining corruption as the “misuse of public power for private gain”);
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDE 14 (2009),
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/84/335/file/2009_TIPlainLanguageGuide_EN.pdf; UNITED
NATIONS HANDBOOK ON PRACTICAL ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES FOR PROSECUTORS AND
INVESTIGATORS 23 (2004), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Handbook.pdf (“There is no
comprehensive, and universally accepted definition of corruption. The origin of the word is from the Latin
corruptus (spoiled) and corrumpere (to ruin; to break into pieces). The working definitions presently in
vogue are variations of ‘the misuse of a public or private position for direct or indirect personal gain.’”);
WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 8–9
(1997), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (“We settled on a
straightforward definition—the abuse of public office for private gain. Public office is abused for private
gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer
bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can
also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft
of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues.”); Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring
Illegal and Legal Corruption in American States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey,
EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS HARV U. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuringillegal-and-legal-corruption-american-states-some-results-safra (emphasis omitted) (“We define illegal
corruption as the private gains in the form of cash or gifts by a government official, in exchange for
providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups. It is the form of corruption that attracts a
great deal of public attention. A second form of corruption, however, is becoming more and more
common in the U.S.: legal corruption. We define legal corruption as the political gains in the form of
campaign contributions or endorsements by a government official, in exchange for providing specific
benefits to private individuals or groups, be it by explicit or implicit understanding.”).
125. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 8 (1985) (“Statecraft has traditionally been
defined as the art of conducting state affairs.”); Roy Coleman, Steve Tombs & Dave Whyte, Capital,
Crime Control and Statecraft in the Entrepreneurial City, 42 URB. STUD. 2511, 2512 (2005) (“The
definitional struggles that determine the trajectory of the governing process take place within the
alliances between locally powerful agencies that—through the partnerships between city centre
managers, chief executives, developers, local authorities, senior police and growth spokespeople—
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instances when state agents advance the state’s financial interests by
stealing from those under its authority.
The term stategraft was born from the case of property tax injustice in
Detroit. Detroit assessors are state agents who imposed inflated property
tax assessments on Detroit property owners, and this act has transferred
millions of dollars from property owners to city and county coffers in
violation of Michigan’s state constitution. There are, however, several
other poignant examples of stategraft. To initiate the conversation, we will
discuss three.
The first example is lands taken from Native Americans in direct
violation of a valid treaty. For instance, the Oneidas once occupied about
six million acres in what is now New York.126 Likewise, the Black Hills of
South Dakota once belonged exclusively to the Lakota Sioux who
considered it sacred land.127 In both cases, U.S. state agents entered into
legally binding treaties with the tribes but then later reneged and
commandeered native lands, illicitly increasing their nascent nation’s
territory. That is, the state itself (not private actors) benefitted from
property illicitly taken from a vulnerable group. Prior to the introduction of
the term stategraft, there was no vocabulary to discuss this phenomenon.
Second, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has sued the City of
Ferguson for what amounts to stategraft.128 The DOJ argues that
herald a form of neo-liberal statecraft.”); Robbie Waters Robichau, The Mosaic of Governance:
Creating a Picture with Definitions, Theories, and Debates, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 113, 115 (2011)
(“Statecraft can be characterized as the ‘exercise of distinctively governmental responsibilities’ and as
‘the art of acting according to duty, justice, and reason on behalf of a community of citizens.’”).
126. See Timothy Egan, The Nation; Mending a Trail of Broken Treaties, N.Y. TIMES: WK. REV.
(June 25, 2000), https://nyti.ms/2jL63aB (“The Oneidas, who once occupied six million acres in New
York, treated with President Washington himself. But over the next century, state officials bought and
sold their land, in violation of laws and court cases requiring federal approval of Indian land transfers.
By 1919, the tribal land had shrunk to 32 acres. With recent gambling revenues, the Oneidas bought
back 11,000 acres, and hired top legal talent to regain the 250,000 acres lost from the reservation. The
20,000 non-Indians who own some of that land say they should not have to pay the price for a failure by
the state to follow the law—nor should they have to fight their own government to hold onto their
cabins, farms and houses.”).
127. See id. (“[T]he Black Hills of South Dakota . . . is the longest unresolved Indian land claim in
the country. Promised to the Lakota Sioux in a treaty from 1868, the land was opened to white
settlement after gold was discovered, leading to the Battle of the Little Big Horn. More than a century
later, the Lakota won a settlement that would have given them $106 million in 1980. But for 20 years,
the Indians living in the poorest county in America have refused it, holding out for the return of their
sacred hills.”).
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 6, at 3 (“The municipal court does
not act as a neutral arbiter of the law or a check on unlawful police conduct. Instead, the court primarily
uses its judicial authority as the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance the City’s
financial interests. This has led to court practices that violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
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Ferguson’s police have engaged in unconstitutional policing that targets
African Americans and unfairly imposes civil and criminal fines on
them.129 Instead of reining in the unlawful police conduct, the courts issued
arrest warrants when the fines went unpaid, advancing the city’s financial
interest and foregoing their role as neutral arbiter.130 It is the City of
Ferguson itself, rather than individual police officers or judges, which
financially benefits from the unconstitutional policing of African
Americans: a classic case of stategraft.
The third and final example of stategraft is the abuse of civil forfeiture
laws. These laws are meant to allow law enforcement to confiscate
property obtained unlawfully and to use the proceeds in the fight against
crime.131 Nevertheless, in many cities, civil forfeiture has been abused, and
police officers illegally seize the property of people never charged or
convicted of any crimes.132 When the opaque legal process that individuals
and equal protection requirements. The court’s practices also impose unnecessary harm,
overwhelmingly on African-American individuals, and run counter to public safety.”); id. at 15
(“Ferguson’s strategy of revenue generation through policing has fostered practices in the two central
parts of Ferguson’s law enforcement system—policing and the courts—that are themselves
unconstitutional or that contribute to constitutional violations. In both parts of the system, these
practices disproportionately harm African Americans. Further, the evidence indicates that this harm to
African Americans stems, at least in part, from racial bias, including racial stereotyping. Ultimately,
unlawful and harmful practices in policing and in the municipal court system erode police legitimacy
and community trust, making policing in Ferguson less fair, less effective at promoting public safety,
and less safe.”).
129. See id. at 2–3 (“Police supervisors and leadership do too little to ensure that officers act in
accordance with law and policy, and rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints of officer
misconduct. The result is a pattern of stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without probable
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; infringement on free expression, as well as retaliation for
protected expression, in violation of the First Amendment; and excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”).
130. See id. at 3 (“Most strikingly, the court issues municipal arrest warrants not on the basis of
public safety needs, but rather as a routine response to missed court appearances and required fine
payments. In 2013 alone, the court issued over 9,000 warrants on cases stemming in large part from
minor violations such as parking infractions, traffic tickets, or housing code violations. Jail time would
be considered far too harsh a penalty for the great majority of these code violations, yet Ferguson’s
municipal court routinely issues warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to timely
pay related fines and fees.”).
131. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12 & 19, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken; Laura Sullivan, Police Can Seize and Sell
Assets Even When the Owner Broke No Law, NPR (Nov. 10, 2014, 5:46 P.M.), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/10/363102433/police-can-seize-and-sell-assets-even-when-the-owner-brokeno-law (“It is legal for law enforcement agencies to take property from people who haven’t been
convicted of a crime.”).
132. See, e.g., Mobley v. City of Detroit, 938 F. Supp. 2d 669, 674–75, 686 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(holding that a 2008 police raid of the Contemporary Art Institute of Detroit, in which officers detained
patrons’ cars despite having no probable cause, was unconstitutional); First Amended Complaint,
Encarnacion v. City of New York, No. 1:16-CV-00156 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016) (initiating a class
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must traverse to regain their property is more costly than the property
taken, the police department often keeps the property.133 For instance, in
2013, the Washington, D.C. public defender service filed a lawsuit against
the district on behalf of 375 car owners who shared one thing in common:
the police confiscated their vehicles but did not charge them with crimes.134
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in the case, finding that
the main plaintiff was likely to prevail on his claim under the Due Process
Clause in the US Constitution.135 Given the constitutional violations
brought to light by the suit, the parties settled the case after the City agreed
to modify its forfeiture laws.136 More significantly, this is a classic case of
stategraft because police officers abused civil forfeiture laws and
confiscated cars from innocent people whose poverty rendered them unable
to recover their vehicles. Most importantly, it was the police department
itself (rather than individual officers) that financially benefitted from this
illicit action.
This list of examples is not meant to be exhaustive; instead, the goal is
to highlight the pervasiveness of stategraft, which has five principle
elements: (1) state agents, (2) transferring property, (3) from residents to
action alleging that New York City’s civil forfeiture practices are unconstitutional); Michael Sallah,
Feds Open Probe of Bal Harbour Police Money Laundering, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 25, 2015, 5:31
P.M.), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article41397702.html (“In an
earlier investigation three years ago, federal agents found Bal Harbour misspent money from seized cars
and cash to pay for police salaries, but investigators never examined the money raked in during the
laundering sting—at least $71.5 million—until now.”); Stillman, supra note 131 (telling the stories of
several people who have had their property taken from them via civil forfeiture and noting, inter alia,
that “[t]he Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia won the release of Moreira’s car last
summer, and in May filed a lawsuit against the city on behalf of approximately three hundred and
seventy-five car owners like Moreira. Describing the policy as ‘devastating for hundreds of families
who depend on their cars for many of the urgent and important tasks of daily life,’ it called for higher
standards of proof and the end of penal-sum fees.”).
133. It can be extremely expensive to secure the return of property confiscated through civil
forfeiture laws. See Stillman, supra note 131 (“Most of those detained had to pay more than a thousand
dollars for the return of their cars; if the payment wasn’t made promptly, the car would become city
property.”). See also Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Steven Rich, D.C. Police Plan for Future Seizure
Proceeds Years in Advance in City Budget Documents, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2014), http://wapo.st/
1tVIzf5 (“Among other things, the Public Defender Service focused on a city requirement that vehicle
owners post bonds of up to $2,500 before they were permitted to challenge seizures. In August 2013, all
parties agreed to put the lawsuit on hold as the District worked to modify its forfeiture laws.”).
134. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 105 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he District’s continued retention of his vehicle without the opportunity to be heard deprives him of
his constitutionally-protected rights. ‘It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a
party’s constitutional rights.’”).
135. See id. at 91, 105–07.
136. See O’Harrow & Rich, supra note 133 (“The council’s reform effort began last year after the
Public Defender Service for the District filed a class action lawsuit against the city, alleging that police
violated the constitutional rights of residents in the process of seizing their cars.”).
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the state, (4) in violation of the state’s own laws, (5) to the detriment of a
vulnerable group.
State agents. “State agents” are individuals or groups who use the
state’s police powers to compel people to act or refrain from taking certain
actions.137 When working in their official capacity, state agents either have
the power to make laws, policies, and administrative rules, or are acting
upon the explicit directions of those with the power to do so. But in their
unofficial capacity, state agents promote the state’s financial interests
without explicit permission from lawmakers, who either look the other way
or support their actions without directly authorizing them. In Ferguson, for
example, the targeting of African Americans for fees and fines was not an
official written policy, but it was a pervasive practice which used the police
and courts to enlarge city coffers.138
Transferring property. Property includes tangible property such as
money, financial instruments, real property, and personal property. It also
includes intangible property like entitlements, licenses, and intellectual
property. Property transfer can involve taking away the right to use,
exclude, or transfer property, or taking the property itself. In the three
examples discussed above, the American government took land from native
Americans;139 the city of Ferguson took money away from its AfricanAmerican citizens using discriminatory fees and fines;140 through civil
forfeiture, many cities have taken all types of real and personal property
away from people not charged with a crime;141 and illegal property tax
assessments have led to inflated property tax bills in Detroit.142
From residents to the state. For these purposes, a “resident” is anyone
who is subject to the state’s police powers, even if the person is not
physically within the state’s geographic boundaries.143 To qualify, property
137. See Steven Maynard-Moody & Michael Musheno, State Agent or Citizen Agent: Two
Narratives of Discretion, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 329, 337 (2000) (describing state agents as
the state bureaucrats who are entrusted with actually enacting laws and policies). See also Claire O.
Finkelstein, Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law: The Case of Paul Touvier, 30
TEX. INT’L L.J. 261, 270 (1995); Colin Yeo, Agents of the State: When Is an Official of the State an
Agent of the State?, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 509, 517 (2002).
138. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (describing the City of Ferguson’s
discriminatory fees and fines).
139. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Part III.
143. This includes both documented and undocumented citizens. The tax code’s definition of
“resident” is also expansive. Harry A. Shannon, III, The General Definition of Residence Under United
States Income Tax Treaties, 16 INTERTAX 204, 206 (1988) (“Under Article 4(1) [of the 1976 Treasury
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must be transferred from residents directly or indirectly to state accounts.
For instance, land usurped from Native Americans went to U.S. federal and
state governments;144 fees and fines charged by Ferguson enlarged that
city’s coffers; and property taken through civil forfeiture benefits the law
enforcement agencies that confiscate the property.145
In violation of the state’s own laws. Laws include legislation, judicial
decisions, administrative rules, and policies that have the power to bind
residents and regulate their actions.146 Only the law in effect at the time the
property was taken is relevant. In the examples above, police officers abuse
civil forfeiture laws to illegally confiscate property, the US government
abrogated legally binding treaties with Native peoples; the DOJ has argued
that the City of Ferguson contravened the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses of the US constitution; and the Detroit assessor violated the
Michigan Constitution’s property tax assessment limits.
To the detriment of a vulnerable group. If the state breaks a law, then
ideally citizens can go to the courts, police, or other state functionaries to
correct the injustice. A vulnerable group is one that occupies a subordinate
position within the polity, so they are often unable to identify or resist
stategraft due to limited financial resources, lack of access to justice, and
inadequate information. That is, vulnerability makes groups more likely to
experience stategraft and also less able to combat it when it does occur.
Tax injustice in Detroit is the perfect example. Our data show that
homeowners with lower-valued homes experienced unconstitutional
property tax assessments at a far greater rate than homeowners with highervalued homes.147 This is because people with more information and
resources had the ability to hire lawyers and other intermediaries to assist
with appealing their property tax assessments and averting stategraft. But
Department’s Model Income Tax Treaty], a person is a resident of a contracting state if he is subject to
tax in that state on the basis of his domicile, residence, citizenship, place of management, place of
incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature. ‘Person’ is defined in Article 3(1)(a) to include
an individual, a partnership, a company, an estate, a trust and any other body of persons. Both natural
and juridical persons can be ‘residents’ for treaty purposes.”).
144. See supra note 126.
145. See Stillman, supra note 131 (“But civil-forfeiture statutes continued to proliferate, and at the
state and local level controls have often been lax. Many states, facing fiscal crises, have expanded the
reach of their forfeiture statutes, and made it easier for law enforcement to use the revenue however
they see fit. In some Texas counties, nearly forty per cent of police budgets comes from forfeiture.
(Only one state, North Carolina, bans the practice, requiring a criminal conviction before a person’s
property can be seized.) Often, it’s hard for people to fight back. They are too poor; their immigration
status is in question; they just can’t sustain the logistical burden of taking on unyielding
bureaucracies.”).
146. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
147. See supra Part III.
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due to lack of information and resources, Detroit’s established appeals
process was unavailable to the most vulnerable populations.
Stategraft is a valuable concept because existing categories do not
well describe this phenomenon. The most common definitions of
corruption are predicated on private gain, and there is currently no concept
to describe state-led theft that primarily benefits the state.148 Constitutional
takings is a category ill-equipped to describe the phenomenon because
while sometimes instances of stategraft qualify as a takings, other times
they do not. For instance, while courts have ruled that certain broken
treaties with Native Americans violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause,149 illegal property tax assessments in Detroit would most likely not
qualify because courts have ruled that the state’s tax-and-spend powers do
not infringe upon the Takings Clause.150 Courts have also ruled that civil
forfeiture does not run afoul of the taking clause.151 Lastly, because
stategraft, by its definition, involves an illegal transfer of property, the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments will always
apply.152 Stategraft, however, is a unique type of due process violation that
deserves focused analysis because when a state steals from its own citizens,
148. See supra text accompanying note 124.
149. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (“[T]he 1877 Act
effected a taking of tribal property, property which had been set aside for the exclusive occupation of
the Sioux by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. That taking implied an obligation on the part of the
Government to make just compensation to the Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of
interest, must now, at last, be paid.”).
150. See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (prohibiting suits to restrain assessment or collection). See also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 283 (1985)
(arguing that taxes and all regulations should fall under the takings clause but acknowledging that “[t]he
proposition that all taxes are subject to scrutiny under the eminent domain clause receives not a whisper
of current support”); Lee Anne Fennel & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
287, 299 (“Courts and commentators alike have read Eastern Enterprises to mean that general
obligations to pay money do not fall within the ambit of ‘private property’ protected by the Takings
Clause.”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2182 (2004) (“[T]he
broad legal consensus is that legislatures effectively have unlimited authority to impose tax burdens.”).
151. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (citation omitted) (“We conclude
today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are ‘too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.’ The State
here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets.
The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court
and the Michigan Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Michigan is therefore affirmed.”); AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1150
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a government seizure of pharmaceutical drugs under its police power did
not constitute a taking).
152. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); id. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
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this has dire consequences for a nation’s democratic foundations.
Consequently, stategraft is a theoretical framework that fills an important
gap in the literature. We have provided the theoretical scaffolding for the
concept of stategraft, upon which other scholars can build.
CONCLUSION
Property tax assessments provide a penetrating lens into governmental
abuses of power that elude detection. Given the complexity of calculating
property tax assessments, it is difficult for citizens to know when local
government has exceeded its legitimate taxing authority and crossed into
the realm of illegal extraction. By assessing properties in violation of the
Michigan Constitution, Detroit has crossed this line and is engaging in
stategraft. The illegality is systemic and has persisted since 2009, which is
when property values in Detroit declined precipitously. In 2014, the City of
Detroit recognized the need to comply with its state constitution by
correctly aligning assessments with property values. Consequently, in 2014
and 2015 Mayor Duggan announced across-the-board cuts to property
assessments. Nevertheless, lower-valued properties are still assessed far in
excess of 50 percent of their market value, while the assessed values for
higher-valued properties have fallen below this constitutional limit.
The illegal assessments in Detroit have severe consequences, the most
dire being that it has unleashed a property tax foreclosure epidemic.153
Based on our analysis, we recommend that Detroit place a moratorium on
property tax foreclosures of owner occupied homes until it can ensure that
it is in compliance with Michigan’s constitutional and statutory laws. At
the very least, Detroit must ensure that delinquent taxpayers—on the verge
of foreclosure—are not subject to unconstitutional tax assessments and
inflated property tax bills.154 More significantly, we encourage the City of
Detroit to begin a dialogue with its citizens about how to heal from the
social, economic, and psychological consequences of stategraft.

153. See Alm et al., supra note 9, at 283 (concluding that properties with certain characteristics
are more likely to be tax-delinquent); Dewar et al., Disinvesting, supra note 9, at 606–07 (arguing that
tax foreclosure policies encouraged divestment, spread blight, and created negative externalities);
Dewar, Lessons, supra note 9, at 168–73 (comparing Cleveland’s land bank system for disposing of
abandoned land with Detroit’s method); Kirtner, supra note 9, at 1085 & n.9 (offering legal suggestions
for local governments to put foreclosed properties to productive use).
154. See generally Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax
Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit (Jan. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).

